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THE GROWING LAW*
My subject is the Growing Law. Growing rather than chang-
ing because the latter word connotes often a change for the
worse; the actual process is in the long run a change for the
better. The growth is for the most part the work of the courts.
Of the three methods of development described by Sir Henry
Maine, legal fictions and equity are obviously judicial in char-
acter. Statutes, though legislative in their origin, ultimately
become what the courts make them. The Statute of Uses was
meant to work a great change in the law in the interest of the
King. In the hands of the Courts it increased the power of the
tenant in fee simple and ultimately, as is said, did no more than
add three words to a deed of bargain and sale. Chapter 24 of
Edward the First's great Statute of Westminster the Second was
on its face a mere regulation of procedure. In the hands of the
courts it led not only to a most effective remedy but to the
greatest development of substantive law and legal rights. New
uses for the action on the case continued to be found for six
centuries and new legal rights developed therefrom, until within
the last fifty years the new procedure opened our minds to the
idea that, even in the courts of law, where there is a legal right
there must be a remedy whether we have a special name for the
action or not. The reformed procedure may in the end prove
the most effective machinery the courts can use in the develop-
ment of the substantive law.
We need not go as far as the Statute of Uses or the Statute of
Westminster the Second. For more than one hundred years our
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courts have been construing the Federal Constitution and our
national government is as much the result of judicial construc-
tion and definition as of legislative action.
The power and influence of the national tribunals has increased.
The power of the state tribunals has kept equal step. Our state
constitutions have become more and more codes of law in spite
of the warnings of thoughtful lawyers, judges and statesmen.
The constantly increasing limitations imposed upon legislative
action in face of the certain knowledge that these limitations
necessarily add to the power of the courts, is a tribute, uncon-
scious and unavowed though it be, by the people to the integrity
and the fidelity of the judges. We foresee the danger of relax-
ing the sense of responsibility in legislative bodies and executive
officers but we are powerless to counteract the tendency to tie
the hands of the political branch of the government and to throw
responsibility upon the judicial branch. Further limitations are
proposed by the convention in New York; amendments to the
Federal Constitution prohibiting polygamy and the traffic in liquor
are urged by influential citizens. The courts are not free from
just grounds of criticism but have, upon the whole, worked to
the satisfaction of the people because they are the nearest
approach we have to a learned body acting upon motives of
reason and not of passion, and disregarding to a greater extent
than is found possible with legislatures or executive officers, or
would be found possible with an electorate, considerations other
than the very right of the case. We have therefore conceded to
the courts, not without strong and intelligent opposition, a far
greater power over the making of the law than has ever been
conceded before. The opposition of intelligent men, of whom
Chief Justice Gibson is a memorable example, to this control
of the courts has in the past disappeared by force of necessity
as the cases have arisen. Whether our judicial system can stand
the strain that is put upon it as our constitutions become codes,
may well be doubted. Some tribunal however must interpret the
meaning of language and its applicability to the case in hand.
The influence of the courts has increased because of the fair-
ness of their methods, slow, too slow, as they often are. The
patient hearing of both sides to a controversy, the legal forms
devised for the protection of rights, the free discussion by those
who decide, and not least important, the formulation of reasons
to vindicate the result require time, but insure fair consideration.
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The influence of the judicial tribunals on the growth of the
law is likely to increase with the enactment of new statutes now
proceeding so rapidly. Every word almost must be defined and
construed to determine the rights of litigants. It may not always
be what we now call a court that will define and construe. As
the complexity of government increases, Boards and Commis-
sions are established with what is substantially judicial power.
What pleases the commission often has the force of law, but so
strong is the system of the courts that Boards and Commissions
almost as a matter of course pursue substantially the methods
of the ordinary courts of law; notice, a hearing, formulation
of reasons for the results reached and the embodiment of those
results in orders or judgments are the essential elements, call them
by what name you will. The necessity for some one tribunal
that shall ultimately decide between conflicting results in lower
tribunals will always be recognized. Congress has ,recently
extended the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
cases where State tribunals have decided in favor of and not
against a claim of Federal right. The process of definition and
construction is a never ending one. For more than forty years
the courts have been defining the words liberty, property and
due process of law as used in the i 4 th Amendment to the Fed-,
eral Constitution and the end is not yet. Whether or not the
Congress and the Legislatures that adopted the amendment
meant to secure more than the civil rights of the recently enfran-
chised colored race against hostile action by their former own-
ers, is a question of no present importance. It has long been set-
tled that the amendment applies not only to all natural persons,
black or white, but to artificial persons.
These thoughts are familiar to all of you. I have recalled
them because they emphasize the power necessarily devolved
upon the courts in making even the statute law by defining and
construing the language used by our legislatures or, under our
constitutional theories, sometimes by the people.
The development of the law by the processes which Maine
calls equity and fictions, is quite as important in its effect upon
the rights of men as the construction of statutes. Growth by the
extension of legal principles seems more naturally the work of
the courts than growth by judicial construction of statutes and
constitutions. The old equity heads of fraud, mistake and trust
are constantly extended by new interpretations; the courts of law
YALE LAW JOURNAL
are permeated with equitable doctrines. We hold men to implied
contracts, but the implied contract is a mere fiction devised by the
courts of law to enable them to do justice where justice is
impossible on the strict conception of contract or tort. As in
earlier days the action of assumpsit was based upon the theory
of a tort and by means of a fiction, a recovery was permitted
upon the theory that the failure to perform a contract was in the
nature of a trespass, so we have come to allow a recovery where
money ought to be paid ex aequo et bono upon the fiction of a
contract that never existed. One of the more recent fictions,
called by Pollock one of the most brilliant fictions of the Common
Law, is that an agent who acts without authority impliedly war-
rants that he has such authority. There is no authority in fact
from the principal, there is no warranty in fact by the pretended
agent to the third party; but justice is served by assuming a
warranty that does not exist and forbidding the pretended agent
to deny it. The doctrine of equitable estoppel which closes a
man's mouth when he ought not to speak, and the doctrine of
equitable conversion which enables us to escape from the unfortu-
nate historical distinction between real and personal property
by treating that as done which ought to be done, have often
enabled the courts to do justice. The very use of the word
ought marks the tendency of the law to an ethical standard,
away from archaic formalism. At common law, fraud in the
consideration of a sealed instrument could not be set up as a
defense; a sealed instrument was too solemn a thing to be trifled
with. We are so far away from that doctrine that we are
sometimes in danger of forgetting that the defense of failure of
consideration is not applicable to a case of formal contracts under
seal where neither party meant that there should be a considera-
tion. Our zeal for progress and growth will often lead us astray
unless we know the history of the law and keep fast hold of
the principles upon which it is founded.
The tendency from formalistic conceptions to ethical concep-
tions marks the growth of the law in many ways. We no longer
ask whether the word "warrant" is used upon a sale of chattels
as when Chandelor vs. Lopus was decided; we have come to
the view of Baron Parke that where a man sells goods by descrip-
tion he warrants the description as true. We may come in time
to hold men to responsibility for their representations as to
material facts on which others are expected to act and by which
others are cheated of their money, whether the elements of fraud
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are present or not, whether the affirmation is made with knowl-
edge of its falsity or in mere ignorance and carelessness whether
it be true or not. These are cases where there is fault on the
part of the defendant. There are cases in which we are going
back to a medieval conception of a common responsibility, with-
out personal fault, the responsibility of a family, an association,
a community, which until recently was chiefly known in our law
in the liability of a municipality for damage by rioters. The
Workmen's Compensation Acts rest on what is fundamentally
the same theory. Although sometimes expressed in terms that
every industry should pay its own costs of production, or that
the waste of human life and force caused by modem methods
of great power and rapidly moving machinery, should be a charge
upon the industry, and not upon the unfortunate sufferer or his
family, yet in fact every one expects what will no doubt be the
actual result, that the loss will be distributed as taxes are distrib-
uted, and part at least will fall upon consumers and be paid in
higher prices, or be distributed through the methods of insur-
ance among a still larger public. We need not speculate upon
the question whether in the long run workmen will be helped, or
whether part of the burden will fall upon them through a reduc-
tion of wages or a failure to secure an advance which they would
otherwise receive. The economic problem may be left to the
economists. The interesting legal point is that there is a legal
liability without fault, a liability much more extensive than that
which grew out of the rule respondeat superior, qualified as that
was by the fellow servant rule and the theory of assumption
of risk. The familiar history illustrates how the law grows.
The sense of right prevailing in the time of Lord Holt, the devel-
opment of the rule and its application to particular concrete
cases by logical deduction or by analogy, the qualification by dis-
tinctions and refinements still in harmony with fundamental legal
principles as the injustice in particular cases became apparent,
and finally the intervention of the legislature by statute to make
the law correspond with changed public opinion of what is just.
To what extent the statutes change the law must be determined
by definition and construction by the courts. No man can fore-
see how far new legal conceptions may lead us. To put some of
the cases recently stated by Judge Smith: (i) In a collision on
the highway between a trolley car and a wagon, not due to any,
one's fault, but due to mere accident, the motorman and a paying
passenger are injured; the motorman recovers by virtue of the
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Workmen's Compensation Act; the paying passenger can recover
no compensation. (2) In a collision on the highway between an
automobile driven by the owner's hired chauffeur and a wagon
driven by the owner, not due to any one's fault, but a mere acci-
dent; the chauffeur can recover the statutory compensation
from the owner of the automobile; the owner of the wagon has
no right of action. (3) Collision on the highway between trolley
car and wagon driven by its owner, due in part to the negligence
of the motorman and in part to the negligence of the driver of
the wagon; both motorman and driver are hurt; the contributory
negligence of the driver of the wagon prevents his recovery from
the trolley company; the negligence of the motorman does not
prevent his recovery of the statutory compensation. (4) A steam
boiler in a machine shop explodes without the fault of any one.
A workman in the shop is injured, and a neighboring building is
damaged. The workman can recover from the owner of the
shop, his employer, but the owner of the building has no remedy.
Such inconsistencies must eventually lead to a change that will
assimilate the rules of liability in the different cases. The change
is not likely to be the repeal of our new statutes. We are more
likely to hold liable those by the conduct of whose business,
injury to others has been caused. I do not question that this
change may be brought about by the courts. What I have already
said has been to little purpose unless I concede that the courts
"can and do make new law; and also can and do unmake old
law." It probably will not be done directly and avowedly, but
may be done indirectly, as judge Smith suggests, by a very liberal
construction of the doctrine res ipsa loquitur; by a broad view of
what constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence; and by com-
pelling the defendant to prove that he was not negligent, instead
of compelling the plaintiff to prove negligence. By these changes
the theoretical basis of liability would still be the negligence of
the defendant; the practical result would be to change the exist-
ing rule and assume negligence in the absence of proof to the
contrary. Perhaps the effect of the change would not be great.
Imperceptible and unavowed changes in the law sometimes come
from the refusal of jurors to render verdicts, but sometimes also
from a change of the views of judges. Every one familiar with
personal injury cases must be impressed with the change upon
the questions whether there is any evidence of negligence to go
to the jury, whether the defendant has proved contributory negli-
gence, and whether the risk has been assumed.
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It is within the power of the courts to change the law. They
ought to leave that to the legislature. The difference is funda-
mental. The legislature provides for the future. The courts
deal with the past, and it is shocking to think that a man can be
held to accountability by a change of judicial construction under
circumstances in which he was not legally liable at the time.
Retrospective statutes and ex post facto laws are no more repre-
hensible than retrospective changes of the law by judicial decision.
It is forbidden to make a new crime by ex post facto legislation.
It is equally wrong to make a new tort or crime by a change of
judicial construction. We are witnessing another change. It
becomes more and more common to make misdemeanors of viola-
tions of law that may well be the subject of penal actions but
ought not to be treated as crimes. Two reasons lead to such
statutes; the exploded notion that severity of punishment acts
as a deterrent, and the positive advantage of having prosecu-
tions conducted at public expense and risk. We do even worse.
We forget the wholesome principle that requires criminal intent,
a criminal mind, and we seek to hold men as criminals for acts
the illegality of which has been doubtful even to the courts, or
acts which are pronounced illegal in the face of previous decisions
to the contrary. Some way will no doubt be found to escape such
injustice, as the courts have found ways to escape before.
In 1798 the Supreme Court of the United States decided that
the prohibition of ex post facto laws in the Federal Constitution
applied only to statutes relating to crime. Regret was expressed
in the opinion that retrospective laws affecting property should be
passed, but the constitutional prohibition was held inapplicable
to those cases. Twenty years later, in 1819, the court decided that
a provision of a charter of a private corporation was a contract,
protected against hostile state legislation by the Federal Consti-
tution. Vested rights were thereby given protection perhaps
greater than if the ex post facto clause had been construed to for-
bid retrospective legislation. Subsequently it was found that this
rule tied the hands of the state when they ought not to be tied,
and the doctrine of the police power was invoked to limit the rule.
The police power has proved a most potent instrument for sus-
taining the powers of government and limiting property rights.
It is a long way from the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals in 1856 that a law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating
liquors owned by any person within the state when the act took
effect, was unconstitutional, to the decision of the United States
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Supreme Court in 1887 that the prohibitory legislation of Kansas
did not deprive the citizens of the state of their constitutional
rights. We have traveled farther in the last thirty years. The
police power is now broadly defined as extending to all great pub-
lic needs and it is said may be put forth in aid of what is sanc-
tioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to
the public welfare. Does this definition, broad as it is, go further
than that of Chief Justice Shaw sixty years ago, when he said that
all property is held subject to those general regulations which
are necessary to the common good and general welfare? Neither
definition helps much in the solution of a particular case. What
is the prevailing morality, what is the strong and preponderant
opinion, what does the common good require, what is greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare? The decision must
be left to the courts in concrete cases, and the decision of to-day
is likely to differ from what it would have been twenty-five or
fifty years ago. The point of view of the courts is more impor-
tant than the language in which the police power is defined.
The final determination of the validity or meaning of a statute
by the courts has great disadvantages. A plain man ought to be
able to tell by examination of a statute whether certain conduct
would be criminal. This is sometimes impossible, especially with
the great mass of recent legislation affecting matters of business.
The meaning of some statutes is difficult for anyone to guess.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently been called
upon to pass upon a conviction for the crime of combining to
depreciate below, or to enhance above, its real value the price of
any article. The real value was declared by the state court to
be "its market value under fair competition, and under normal
market conditions." The defendants were therefore, as the court
said, required to guess at their peril what their product would
have sold for if a combination had not existed, and nothing else
violently affecting values had occurred. The amount paid for
materials and labor had increased in a greater ratio than the
cost of their product. They were called upon to guess what
would have been the price of their article in an imaginary world
on pain of being punished as criminals. The court held that the
legislation exceeded the constitutional power of the state. What
other result could do justice? Probably most of us feel that Lord
Bowen went too far in declaring that competition must be carried
to the bitter end; but can the difficulty be solved by an attempt
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to compel competition on the one hand and to say it shall go so
far and no farther on the other? Is it possible to set a fixed
bound in a changing world? The solution is rather that to which
we are slowly struggling,--that the wrong is in the intent to do
harm to your neighbor as your direct object, not in the harm that
is merely incidental to the conduct of business for your own profit
as efficiently as you can. Such a solution is in harmony with
the general ethical tendency of the law that an act otherwise
doubtful in character may be right or wrong according to the
good or the bad intent of the actor. The legality of a high fence
may depend on whether it is spiteful or not.
The great discussions of recent times have centered about the
clause of the I4th amendment forbidding a state to deprive any
person of liberty or property without due process of law. Liberty
and property are common words, but their exact legal connota-
tion is exceedingly difficult. Hundreds of cases and thousands
of pages have not accomplished the task of defining either with
precision. If there ever had been or could be absolute property
or absolute liberty, we might hope some time to state finally what
the words mean. But the right of liberty and the right of prop-
erty have always been circumscribed by the similar rights of
others. In a civilized society no man lives or can live to himself
alone. All property is necessarily subject to the application of the
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, to the right of emi-
nent domain, to the right of the state to take by taxation. Inas-
much as the exercise of any right of property by the owner may
injure another, the Latin maxim does not help to a solution; the
real question is what injury to another is, and what is not per-
missible. You may build a sky scraper and shut off your neigh-
bor's light and air; you may use your property in fair competi-
tion, although it drives your neighbor out of business; you may
not resort to unfair competition; and here again we must define
what is unfair. The state may condemn property for public uses
upon making compensation; but what is a public use? It may
take a portion by way of taxation for a public purpose; what
is a public purpose? The conception of property is not only
difficult in itself, but differs with the times and changes with
changing circumstances. Forty years ago it was arguable
whether the prices to be exacted by railroad companies for trans-
portation could be fixed by the companies without contrdl by the
public authorities. During the forty years that have passed, the
sphere of public control has broadened and the property rights
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of all public service companies have been qualified. The rates
they may charge, the wages they shall pay, the kind and amount
of service they shall render, are all subject to the public authority.
Apparently all that is left is a right to select the managers of the
business who may make a profit for the owners if they can, under
the conditions imposed upon them. Recently the court has
required the owners of terminal facilities at a great city to allow
others the use upon equal terms. The substantial effect is to
make the owners trustees for all transportation companies. This
decision is perhaps the greatest step yet made toward the social-
ization of property. The decision that all the banks of a state
may be compelled to insure the security of depositors in every
one, is another great step. These two decisions alone, though
there are many others leading in the same direction, show the
qualification of the concept of private property by judicial con-
struction in the direction of paramount public right. The neces-
sary tendency of civilized communities where men live in close
contact with one another, is to subject private interests to what
is supposed to be for the public welfare. There grow up, on the
other hand, new kinds of property of great value. A vain attempt
was made in the eighteenth century to establish a right of prop-
erty in intellectual productions,-a common law copyright. It
failed and it was not until the I9 th century that copyright was
established by statute,1 and only late in the century that this
right of intellectual property became international; even now it
is limited in time. On common law principles there is also in
some cases a sort of copyright before publication. The goodwill
of a business is a well recognized species of property, and it has
even been claimed, I believe thus far without success, that the
expectation of future profits might be capitalized as if it were
existing property. Going value is a species of property, the char-
acter of which has perhaps not been finally settled. The con-
'I leave this as I wrote it, although it is inaccurate. Mr. George Haven
Putnam has called my attention to the fact that the King's Bench decided
that there was a common law right of copyright after publication, and
that a majority of the judges in the House of Lords held that this was
taken away by the Statute of Anne. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burrows 23o3;
Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burrows 2408. The report of the latter case
requires to be supplemented by other reports, which are summarized in
7 English Ruling Cases 70, and in Putnam's "The Question of Copy-
right," 412 ff. My statement that it was not until the 19th century that
copyright was established by statute is a blunder.
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test still goes on over the question to what extent special fran-
chises are valuable property; that they are property for some
purposes is well settled. Patent rights, often a most valuable
property, have been created by statutes. The courts have created
a property right in trade secrets by protecting them from dis-
closure; and in trade marks, brands and packages by protecting
them from unfair competition and piratical imitation. Equitable
easements are the creation of the courts. Perhaps the so-called
right of privacy may be called a property right; it is coming
more and more to be regarded as a personal right; but the courts
have frowned upon the contention that the reputation in the South
of belonging to the white race is a right of property.
The right of liberty embraces more than the mere right to be
free from personal restraint. It includes the right to enjoy a
man's faculties, and to use them in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and
enter into all contracts proper, necessary and essential; but there
is no absolute freedom of contract. If there were, a system of
slavery might be established, notwithstanding the thirteenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution, for that amendment
forbids only involuntary servitude. Contracts have been made
voluntarily by men perfectly able to contract on terms of equality,
which amounted to a perpetual sale of personal services, and if
enforced in equity by the process of injunction, would be a very
real slavery. Such a contract might be advantageous to the serv-
ant, by securing to him food, shelter and raiment for his life
better than he could otherwise secure for himself, but has for
years been condemned as an unlawful restraint of trade. Yet
a child under twenty-one is in the father's power and legally
little better than a slave, sometimes in need of the protection
afforded by our acts forbidding child labor. The courts have
always restricted freedom of contract. There was a time when
if a man entered into a bond upon condition and failed to per-
form the condition, he became liable for the amount of the bond;
the courts interfered and held that the amount of the bond was a
penalty only, to secure performance of the condition, and not a
debt due immediately upon failure to perform the condition in
exact accordance with its terms; the parties might have con-
tracted freely, but the courts refused their aid to the unconscion-
able bargain. Oftentimes the parties to a contract try to settle
for themselves what shall be paid for its breach, and agree on
liquidated damages; the courts will, according to a presumed
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intent, treat the sum agreed upon as damages to be paid, or as
a mere penalty intended to secure the actual damages only. A
mortgage is a -leed which by its terms becomes absolute on fail-
ure to perform the condition; it has not for centuries been in
fact the deed which the parties on its face declare it to be, and
it is impossible for the parties by any form of words, short of a
complete change of the nature of the transaction, to do away with
the equity of redemption which has been created by the courts
in spite of the formal agreement of the parties. The rule as to
an equity of redemption is ancient, and may well be said to be
made part of every mortgage by the law. But in recent years the
enterprise of brewers has undertaken to impose as one of the
terms of mortgages securing the repayment of money loaned for
the purchase of a public house, an agreement to buy beer of the
mortgagees. The courts have refused to enforce such contracts,
because the agreement, as is said, clogs the equity of redemption.
Clog is an expressive metaphor; the plain fact is that the courts
refuse to enforce the contract the parties have voluntarily made.
Contracts in restraint of trade is an old title in the law, which
long ago acquired the special meaning of contracts in unreason-
able restraint of trade, and retained that meaning until within
twenty years an attempt has been made to declare all contracts
in restraint of trade invalid, not only in disregard, perhaps in
ignorance, of the history of the law, but of the very obvious
fact that every contract is necessarily a restraint of trade to the
extent that it is binding. Contracts in restraint of marriage have
always been illegal, from public considerations, without regard
to possible pecuniary advantage of the parties. Contracts of
counsel and physicians for fees were long illegal, perhaps are
still in many jurisdictions. Wagering contracts are no longer
permitted. Freedom of contract has never been the rule as
between attorney and client, guardian and ward, trustee and
cestui que trust, dependents and those in a dominant position
over them. Public policy has made these exceptions to the rule
of freedom of contract, but public policy is an unruly steed, and
likely to throw an incautious rider. We must not forget what
Lord Bramwell said, that public policy requires the enforcement
of contracts.
The tendency toward limitation of freedom of contract is
strong. We not only regulate by statute the hours and condi-
tions of labor, require the payment of wages in cash, regulate
the relations between employer and employee and labor unions,
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but we forbid contracts not to take advantage of the statutes.
Some of the most puzzling decisions arise in cases in which com-
mon carriers or insurance companies are involved, in the very
obvious effort of the courts to save careless shippers and thought-
less assured, from the contracts they have in fact made. I have
known a policy of fire insurance to be reformed, in the interest
of the assured, although there never was any contract between
the parties other than the policy itself. The interference with
contract by the import of new terms by judicial implication, by
statutory enactment, or by strained construction, originates in the
effort to prevent one in a position of vantage or gifted with
superior knowledge, from using his advantage in his dealings
with those less fortunate. We cannot help sympathizing with
the feeling when we read the terms imposed upon bootblacks,
upon lumbermen, upon negroes in the South, and even upon
actors and actresses. Contracts that inevitably result in oppres-
sion may well be regulated or forbidden by statute, but it is
exceedingly hazardous for courts to strike out or refine away the
plain words of a written agreement. The truth is that many
of the relations of life cannot well be regulated by contract at
all; for one party, and often both parties, make the contract
relying quite as much upon the custom of the time and place
as upon the written terms. I believe the difficulty between land-
owners and land cultivators in Ireland before Gladstone's legis-
lation was largely due to the fact that the landlords relied on
their strict legal rights by contract, and the tenants relied on the
custom to renew their leases.- The general tendency is to favor
the weaker side, but there is one striking case where, for obvious
reasons, the ordinary constitutional safeguards have been disre-
garded in favor of the stronger party. The provision of the
Federal statutes for the summary arrest and detention of seamen
deserting their ship before the conclusion of the voyage, has been
sustained as a constitutional exercise of power, notwithstanding
the i 3 th Amendment. The weaker side in a bargain might be!
protected by a method more in analogy with legal principles and
by the development of old principles in the ordinary method of
the courts. It has always been held that contracts obtained by
duress are void. The duress that has usually been meant has
been duress of the person by personal restraint or by threats
that would overcome the will of a firm man. Duress, it has
been pointed out, may be quite as effective when it proceeds from
economic forces, and in effect presents to a man the alternative
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of accepting onerous, even outrageous terms, or submitting to
starvation. This view is the theoretical justification for much
recent legislation. Better results might perhaps be worked out
by determining in each case whether in fact an unjust bargain
was forced by economic pressure; for statutes of broad general
application may themselves work injustice by applying legislative
pressure, quite as effective as economic pressure, though working
in the opposite direction.
The greater the experience of a lawyer or a judge, the more
he distrusts broad general principles and theories, and the more
important he thinks it to confine the decision to the particular
case. General principles and legal theories are useful, but they
are useful to point out or illuminate the road, not as a guide for
our footsteps. If we depend upon them, we are in danger of
pitfalls. The theory of the law of nature served a very useful
purpose for many centuries; it still lies at the basis of inter-
national law, but is to-day as antiquated as the theory of the
social compact which played its part, and a great and momentous
part too, in the history of political theory. The expression
"9social justice," much as I dislike the addition of the adjective,
points out the importance of considering the interests of the
organized state and the interests of the people who compose
political societies. Lawyers and judges fall into habits of mental
indolence and take for granted the absolute correctness of legal
rules, and apply them mechanically. It is well to stir us to
thought, that we may not forget that the letter killeth and the
spirit maketh alive. Economic pressure, the struggle of men with
one another for the means of living, makes judicial tribunals
necessary. But for economic pressure, no man would indulge in
the expensive luxury of litigation. With the increasing power
of the state, law becomes more necessary to protect individuals
and to define the limits of state action. Law, says Ihering, is the
intelligent policy of power; it is the subordination of the state
to its own laws; it is conditioned on self control,-a matter of
practise and habit, and is guaranteed by the feeling of right
and the administration of justice. The importance of law as the
protection of the weak increases as the difference between the
whole power of the state represented by organized society, and
the weakness of the individual citizen becomes more and more
marked. Capitalists combine in corporations and corporations in
greater corporations, to protect by their united strength their
property from unjust exactions of power, where individuals how-
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ever stroxig, must sooner yield. Workmen combine in unions to
give to each the benefit of the power of all. Stockholders and
bondholders combine in committees to protect their interests
where the burden would be too great for one man alone. Mere
words and definitions, constitutions and bills of right, will not of
themselves secure justice, important as they are, since some one
must construe and apply them to concrete cases. The decision
of a majority of such voters as choose to go to the polls and to
vote upon the question, upon the merits of a particular case, is
not likely to be as satisfactory as the decision of a bench of
trained lawyers determining the dispute in the cooler atmosphere
of legal reasoning, according to settled rules, the result of long
experience, rather than by the whim of the moment or the seem-
ing justice of the case, though some of the rules may be in fact
archaic and others may seem absurd to those who do not know
and are not willing to learn the historical reasons back of them.
The application of these rules must be worked out by trained
men. When the legal rule is settled, we need only apply it to the
particular case. When it is not settled, it is better that a rule
should be gradually established by a process of inclusion and
exclusion, building up a general rule by a process of induction
in accordance with our time-honored methods, rather than by a
merely logical deduction from broad general theories of law, and
surely better than by a deduction from our own economic or
political theories, or our own guesses as to public policy. The
general sense of intelligent men must in the long run be satis-
fied with the essential justice of legal rules. Laws are always
unstable, says De Tocqueville, unless founded upon the manners
of a nation. Pascal has the same thought: "One," he says,
"affirms the essence of justice to be the authority of the legis-
lator; another, the interest of the sovereign; another, present
custom, and this is the most sure. Nothing according to reason
alone, is just in itself; all changes with time. Custom creates
the whole of equity, for the simple reason that it is accepted. It
is the mystical foundation of its authority." Lawyers may learn
from the theologian and philosopher. When we find a legal
principle firmly established, and find that men have made their
contracts, acquired their property, are bound in family relations
of marriage and parentage, have regulated their lives, in reliance
upon the law, it shocks every sense of justice for a court to
reject the established rule, declare contracts invalid, titles worth-
less, a lawful wife a concubine, and children illegitimate. A rule
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once established must be adhered to in all cases that have arisen
thereunder; the legislature may change it in its application to
future cases. We need not make a fetich of stare decisis as Mr.
Carter said in his argument for the Government in the Income
Tax case, although in that case he insisted that the question had
been so settled that it was not then open to debate. Cases have
arisen, as justice Bradley said, where dicta and even decisions
have been modified, but, he added, it is always done with great
caution and an anxious desire to place the final conclusion reached
upon the fairest and most just construction of the constitution in
all its parts. Adherence to precedents is the glory of the English
law, not a mere slavish following of some decided case in a
mechanical way, but the application of legal principles 
as estab-
lished by or deduced from the decided cases, to new questions
as they arise, by a process of logic, by the analogies of the law,
by reference to the customs of the time, or by clear ethical prin-
ciples. We are forced in new situations to determine what rule
will seem most just to honest and intelligent men, conversant with
the subject. Lord Mansfield inquired into the custom of the
best merchants. We inquire to-day into a question of foreign or
international law as a fact. Why may we not in our effort to
decide new questions, inquire into our own customs as a fact?
That we should do so in reality if not ostensibly, is inevitable.
Custom may not always be a safe guide and cannot be followed
blindly. It must sometimes be subjected to an independent ethical
test. In many ways lawyers trained in the fundamental ideas of
the law of trusts have a sounder morality than business men who
have often thought it no wrong to take secret commissions, or to
profit personally by contracts with corporations they control.
The law has always been in advance of business morality. Cases
may occur where business is conducted according to business rules
which may conflict with express legislative enactment. It is said
that transactions in stocks and bonds involving millions are con-
ducted in reliance on the pledged word of brokers; the courts
cannot for that reason hold that contracts are enforceable where
there is a lack of the memorandum made necessary by the Statute
of Frauds.
What I fear most is the development of law according to some
preconceived theory,---economic, social, or even legal. The Com-
mon Law owes its strength to the faft that it has developed step
by step, as the need has arisen, never taking so long a step that
its path could not be retraced if we were found to have gone
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astray. If the law is to be enduring it must be suited to the
habits and custom of the people. It must necessarily be more or
less of a compromise between different theories, a composite
of different, sometimes warring, forces. The needle oscillates but
finally points to the Pole. It would be a mistake to put individual
interests always ahead of social interests as it would be a mistake
to put social interests always ahead of individual interests. We
are interested in freedom of speech, but freedom of speech must
not degenerate into slander and libel, and the task of the law has
been by decisions in concrete cases to mark the bounds of per-
missible and unpermissible freedom. Society is interested in such
an administration of the criminal law that no guilty man shall
escape; but society, as well as the individual, is interested in
securing the freedom of every innocent man; we therefore pre-
sume one indicted for crime to be innocent although at least
twelve men have said that he should be presumed to be guilty.
At one period of legal history we allow criminals to escape on the
slightest technicality because the punishment in case of conviction
is shocking to our sense of justice; a man who is charged with
stealing a white horse escapes if it proves to have been black and
white. At another time we amend indictments in order to pre-
vent an absurd miscarriage of justice. The law has in the past
shared in the anxiety of the people for a rapid development of
resources and has favored the individual. To-day it is sharing in
a humanitarian movement which protects the weaker members of
society though it may check material development and growth.
Who shall say which policy in the long run, if steadily adhered
to, would be for the best interests of the community,--the policy
which would allow the weakest to be relentlessly driven to the
wall, and strengthen the community of the future by the process
of natural selection, or the policy which would preserve and
protect the weaker? I think we have been wise not to allow our
law to be entirely controlled by either theory. I hear of social
justice. I do not know what the addition of the adjective means.
Probably it is meant to indicate that more regard should be paid
to the interest of the community than to the interest of the indi-
vidual citizens; but the interest of individual citizens is often the
interest of the community. Attempts have been made for many
years to insure freedom of competition, but they have been
accompanied by efforts to prevent too much competition, and the
same legislative bodies have enacted statutes to prevent raising
prices to the detriment of the consumer and to prevent lowering
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prices to the detriment of weaker competitors or of producers;
until they have culminated in the absurdity which the United
States Supreme Court has condemned, requiring sales at the real
value of the commodities, without pointing out how that real
value can be determined.
Social considerations in the administration of justice are not
new. The innkeeper and the common carrier were never allowed
to make such contracts as they chose and they were required to
insure the safety of goods entrusted to their care or within their
protection. Even when they were allowed to make contracts to
lessen the rigor of their legal liability, they were forbidden by
judicial construction to make, contracts exempting themselves
from liability for the negligence of their servants and in some
cases from making contracts that would enable them to make
their compensation proportionate to their risk of loss.
I have achieved my object if I have shown that the law is a
living, vital, growing, and therefore a changing organism. It
must continue to live, to grow, to change, but the changes ought to
be by the processes of growth and not by the processes of destruc-
tion. This will be best achieved by constantly bearing in mind
that the laN# is the resultant of many forces,--the history of the
past, the needs of the present, the hopes of the future, and that
we will achieve the best results by adapting the old principles
to the new needs in the light of our hopes, and not by hastily dis-
carding as unsuited to the present, principles that we do not
know how to develop. New crops can constantly be raised out
of the old fields, but only by men who know how to cultivate
them. Hitherto the work has been done almost wholly by judges.
A new force has come to the front in our country. Lawyers
now in the prime of life have been trained in law schools, and
our reports begin to show the results. The demand for law
schools has made possible the existence of a trained body of stu-
dents and teachers who study the law purely as a science and
obtain an historical experience from books wider than any judge
can obtain in his short life from personal experience of men and
affairs. Students and teachers are not burdened with the diffi-
culty of ascertaining the facts of a particular case, and can
devote themselves to the study of legal principles as exempli-
fied in innumerable cases in different jurisdictions, at different
times, under different systems of law. Practicing lawyers are
absorbed in the interests of their clients. Judges must devote
the larger part of their time to the ascertainment of the exact
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facts of pending cases. Not one case in a hundred gives a court
any trouble, or leads to any difference of view, as to what the
law is; the difficulty generally is to apply well known legal prin-
ciples to the facts of a particular case. The scientific advance
must come from the schools of law. The time may come, perl
haps at no distant time, when our law schools shall attain the
high distinction of the medieval schools of Bologna and Bourges.
They will surely supplant our courts as the authorized and
revered expositors of the law unless the judges can in their opin-
ions break 'away from the tiresome reiteration of legal principles
known to the youngest attorney, and the citation of endless
authorities for indisputable propositions, and confine themselves
to the task of pointing out the precise principle applicable, the
distinction from former cases, and avail themselves of the rare
occasions when legal principles can be legitimately developed to
meet new situations. Most of us, occasionally at least, mistake
the industry of the clerk for the learning of the judge. We
already look to the law reviews from the various law schools
for the scholarly and scientific discussion and development of the
law rather than to the opinions of the courts. The courts must
always, however, be the tribunals which put legal principles to
the final test, for the law is not only a science but an art, and
the dangers of academic discussion can be avoided by submitting
the theories of the closet to the test of practical experience. Mr.
Justice Holmes has well said, the life of the law is not logic, but
experience.
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